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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

Charging a higher fee for disposal of out-oJ-state hazardous waste:
Will the dormant Commerce Clause become dormant?
by Robert H. Abrams

Chemical Waste Management, Inc.
v.

Guy Hunt, Governor of Alabama
(Docket No. 91-471)

Argument Date: April 21 ,1992

As the environmental and public health risks associated
with the disposal of hazardous waste have gained notoriety,
the NIMBY phenomenon (Not In My Back Yard) has
restricted severely the number of hazardous-waste disposal
facilities that have been sited nationwide. On another front,
the increasingly stringent regulation of existing hazardouswaste disposal facilities has forced many to close at the same
time as other existing facilities are running out of space to
receive additional waste. With the conjunction of these
trends, the few licensed facilities having significant capacity
to receive hazardous waste are serving increasingly large
geographic areas. In this case, Emelle, Alabama, finds itself
home to the nation's largest such facility and also finds that
the vast majority of the waste being deposited there is "imported" from other states throughout the nation. Beginning in
1990, Alabama imposed a mandatory additional tipping fee
(i.e. a tax) for the disposal of out-of-state waste, a practice
that the Emelle facility's owner claims is an unconstitutional
discrimination against interstate commerce.
ISSUE
Does the Alabama statute imposing an additional fee of
$72 per ton for the disposal of out-of-state generated hazardous waste violate the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution?
FACTS
Factually, this is a very simple case. Chemical Waste
Management, Inc. (CWM) operates one of the nation's
largest hazardous-waste disposal facilities in Emelle,
Alabama. That facility accepts large amounts of hazardous
waste, more than three quarters of a million tons of it in 1989
alone. Of that waste, 85 percent to 90 percent originates in
states other than Alabama.
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Beginning in 1987, when the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) granted CWM a permit to operate
the Emelle facility, Alabama, led by Governor Guy Hunt,
began a campaign to limit the amount of out-of-state hazardous waste that Emelle would accept. In a press release dated
Aug. 27,1987, the governor was quoted as saying:
"I wish to make it absolutely clear that we will take any
and all action available to us to keep out-of-state waste out of
Alabama. We will handle our own problem but we don't want
anybody else's problems."
Alabama made several unsuccessful efforts to thwart
CWM's operation of the Emelle facility. It challenged EPA's
licensure of the facility and lost. See Alabama ex. rei. Siegelman v. EPA, 911 F.2d 499 (Ll th Cir. 1990). It tried to block
an EPA cleanup of a Texas contamination site on the ground
that polychlorinated biphenol (PCB) waste was going to be
disposed of at the Emelle facility, and lost. See Alabama v.
EPA, 871 F.2d 1548 (lith Cir. 1989).
In May, 1989, the Alabama legislature passed a measure,
popularly known as the Holley Bill, that effectively barred
the treatment in Alabama of hazardous waste generated elsewhere if the state of origin had no hazardous waste disposal
facilities of its own or had not entered into an agreement for
the disposal of its waste with the state of Alabama. This
statute was invalidated in National Solid Wastes Management
Association v. Alabama Department of Environmental
Management, 910 F.2d 713, as modified at 924 F.2d 1001
(llthCir.1990).
Undeterred, Alabama passed Alabama Act No. 90326
(codified at Ala. Code 2230B 1.1 et seq.), the law at issue in
this case. That statute has three parts: a "Base Fee" of $25.60
per ton charged to commercial facilities on all hazardous
waste they accept without regard to its origin, a $72.00 per
ton "Additional Fee" charged only for accepting waste
originating out-of-state, and a provision restricting the total
amount of waste that any facility accepting over 100,000 tons
per year could accept to an amount equal to the amount
accepted during a statutorily defined benchmark period (the
"Cap"). When challenged by CWM, an Alabama circuit court
invalidated the Additional Fee and generally upheld both the
Base Fee and the Cap. The Alabama Supreme Court, in Hunt
v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc., No. 1901043 (Ala.
S.Ct. July 11, 1991), affirmed the rulings in favor ofthe Base
Fee and the Cap and reversed the invalidation of the Additional Fee provision. Certiorari was subsequently granted by
the United States Supreme Court, limited to the issue of the
constitutionality of the Additional Fee.
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BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE

The treatment and disposal of hazardous waste is a major
industry in this country. Annually more than 240 million tons
of hazardous waste are generated by approximately 80,000
different generators. The largest proportion of this total is
comprised of waste corrosives and acids produced by the
chemical industry, although the petroleum refining, metal
finishing, electronics, health services, printing, manufacturing, and transportation industries also produce substantial
amounts of hazardous waste annually. Since 1976, and especially since 1984, subtitle C of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) has provided stringent regulation of
treatment, storage, and disposal facilities (TSDFs).
RCRA's subtitle C TSDF regulation is quite exacting.
The most basic command of that legislation is that all
materials fitting the statute's definition of hazardous waste
must be disposed of at a licensed TSDF. Pursuant to RCRA,
EPA has promulgated detailed regulations prescribing minimum operating standards for the management of hazardous
waste at the approximately 4,700 facilities nationwide that
hold TSDF licenses. These regulations address areas such as
site characteristics, inspection, testing, method of treating
incompatible types of waste, groundwater monitoring, insurance requirements, recordkeeping and reporting obligations, facility closure and post-closure requirements,
contingency planning, and much, much, more. The regulations are sufficiently burdensome and compliance with them
is sufficiently expensive that many of the smaller firms currently operating TSDFs are closing down their operations.
Importantly, not all of the TSDFs are approved to receive
all of the various types of hazardous materials. For example,
the Emelle, Alabama, facility that is the focus of this litigation
is one of two facilities located east of the Mississippi River
approved to accept PCBs. Similarly, owing to its advanced
design and subsurface geology, the Emelle facility is among
the few disposal sites in the entire nation that is licensed to
accept non-pretreated hazardous waste. This is particularly
noteworthy because in 1984 amendments to RCRA, Congress sought to phase out almost all land disposal of hazardous waste, preferring treatment. Until sufficient treatment
capacity is developed, however, a very few sites, including
Emelle, are licensed to accept untreated waste.
As suggested by the facts of this case, large quantities of
hazardous waste currently move in interstate commerce on
their way to TSDFs. Avoiding burdensome and discriminatory taxes is a key element in maintaining competitiveness in that market. Moreover, keeping facilities like
Emelle viable as a repository for even distant waste may have
important national safety benefits. Emelle is the largest
facility in the country, having a usable area that covers 2,700
acres. CWM estimates that the facility could continue to
operate for another century at present, or even increased, rates
of disposal. These sorts of volumes are of national significance. Perhaps more critically, among the reasons Emelle
was able to obtain its licensure is the presence of a unique
geologic feature, the Selma Chalk formation. Although there
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is conflicting testimony in the case regarding permeability
rates due to fractures that may be present, intact portions of
the formation would, according to EPA, prevent leachate
from reaching the aquifer below for upwards of 330 years.
CWM estimates place the period before any leachate reaches
the aquifer at 10,000 years.
When the national importance of the hazardous-waste
disposal problem is taken into account, this becomes a very
vital case on at least three levels. First, this case will determine whether states can charge grossly disproportionate fees
for the disposal of out-of-state hazardous waste at licensed
facilities located within their borders. As such, this case will
contribute significantly to defining the degree to which states
can put the force of their legislative authority behind the
NIMBY sentiments of their residents when it comes to the
disposal of out-of-state hazardous waste. Politically, the lesson of this case will not go unnoticed-what is good intrastate
politics for Governor Hunt in Alabama ("... we don't want
anybody else's problems ...") will be good intrastate politics
in every other state that finds itself "importing" large quantities of out-of-state hazardous waste.
Second, on an economic level, this case could play havoc
with the financial incentives operating in the hazardous-waste
industry. Imagine momentarily that the fee-charging state,
rather than seeking to block imports of hazardous waste,
merely seeks to tax those imports to relieve its own citizens
of alternative taxes. (Being cynical, the state can have it both
ways, i.e., play to the NIMBY fervor while still filling the
state's coffers.) By charging disproportionate fees to out-ofstate disposers in a market where the supply of hazardouswaste disposal capacity is severely limited due to government
regulation, the state can skim a major portion of the economic
rent that would otherwise be captured by the facility operator.
Better still, the state gathers this revenue for itself while
freeing its own in-state hazardous-waste generators from the
financial effects of the tax. Note also that the amounts involved are non-trivial. Here, for example, if the increased fee
at Emelle does not reduce the amount of interstate business
done (due to the absence of less-expensive alternative
facilities) the state will capture an annual Additional Fee of
$56 million.
Finally, on a legal level, as highlighted in the arguments
of the parties that appear below, a decision upholding the
differential fee would mark a significant change in dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. (The operation of the commerce clause in this setting is referred to as "dormant" because the power of the federal government acts as a limit on
state power without affirmative congressional legislative action.) As recently as 1978 the United States Supreme Court
in Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, had little difficulty in striking down a statute that burdened the unrestrained interstate movement of solid waste. Such
discriminatory laws, the Court noted, were subject to a virtual
"per se rule of invalidity." There has been a slight change in
the legal landscape since 1978, largely due to the intervening
case of Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986), which upheld
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Maine's ban on the importation of baitfish. Even so, Maine
v. Taylor is sufficiently distinguishable from both Philadelphia and the present case that to follow it here would announce a far more lenient attitude toward state-imposed
burdens on interstate commerce than had been displayed in
prior cases.
ARGUMENTS
For Chemical Waste Management, Inc. (Counsel ofRecord,
AndrewJ. Pincus; Mayer, Brown & Platt, 2000 Pennsylvania
Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20006; telephone (202) 7780628):
1. The facially discriminatory $72 per ton Additional Fee
violates the Commerce Clause.
2. Facially discriminatory laws have repeatedly been subjected to a virtually per se rule of invalidity.
3. The Additional Fee cannot survive the strict scrutiny
prescribed by Philadelphia v. New Jersey in that (1) there
is no meaningful distinction between in-state and out-ofstate hazardous waste and (2) there are less interstate
discriminatory means available to Alabama that would
accomplish its legitimate health, safety, and environmental interests.
4. The legislation in this case is avowedly protectionist.

Issue No. 10

For Guy Hunt, Governor ofAlabama (Counsel ofRecord,
Bert S. Nettles; Spain, Gillon, Grooms, Blan & Nettles, 2117
2nd Avenue N., Birmingham, AL 35203; telephone (205)
328-4100):
1. Alabama's facially discriminatory Additional Fee is justified by legitimate state concerns regarding the large
volume of hazardous waste being imported into Alabama.
2. Philadelphia v. New Jersey is not controlling because that
case, involving mere municipal solid waste, did not
present the real and substantial health, safety, and environmental risks present in this case.
3. The Additional Fee is a valid exercise of the state's police
power under Maine v. Taylor and older cases involving
quarantine of intrinsically harmful materials.
4. The Additional Fee serves a legitimate police power interest that cannot be served adequately by any less burdensome alternative.
5. The public interest in the safe management of hazardous
waste would be better served by recognizing, rather than
limiting, the ability of the states to control the interstate
movement of hazardous waste.
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